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Lingering Hazardous Chemicals: Missouri’s Step Toward 
Accountability in the Face of Corporate Market Ubiquity 
 






I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
This case note focuses on the legal ramifications stemming from the 
use, disposal, and environmental impacts of a chemical known as 
polychlorinated biphenyl (“PCB”), a product introduced to the United States 
in the late 1920s by Monsanto Company.1  PCBs were mainly used as 
cooling and insulating fluids for industrial transformers and capacitors and 
were manufactured and released into the environment from the 1920s until 
their ban in 1979, but their persistent and toxic nature continue to have 
adverse impacts.2  For example, there are still measurable amounts of PCB in 
feathers of birds currently held in museums.3  
 
Active research spanning fifty years indicates that PCBs are 
carcinogens having the potential to adversely impact the environment.4  
However, between 1930 and 1977, Respondent, Monsanto Company, the sole 
                                                
1 Karylyn Black Kaley, Jim Carlisle, David Siegel & Julio Salinas, Health Concerns 
and Environmental Issues with PVC-Containing Building Materials in Green 
Buildings, CALIFORNIA ENVIRONEMTNAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 2006), 
http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Publications/Documents/GreenBuilding%5C43106016.p
df. 
2 Health Effects of PCBs., U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY (Oct. 2006), 
http://www.calrecycle.ca.gov/Publications/Documents/GreenBuilding%5C43106016.p
df. 
3 Robert Riseborough & Virginia Brodine, More Letters in the Wind, ENVIRONMENT: 
SCIENCE AND POLICY FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, Volume 12, Issue 1 (1970). 
4 Knut Breivik, Andy Sweetman, Jozef Pacyna, & Kevin Jones,” Towards a global 
historical emission inventory for selected PCB congeners – a mass balance approach” 
The Science of Total Environment, 290 (1-3), 181-198 (2002) available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0048969701010750. 
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producer of PCB in North America, produced over 600,000 tons of the 
chemical.5  To this day, high levels of PCB pollution continue to be found in 
the United States.6  This case note will focus on a recent Missouri case in 
which litigants from California developed non-Hodgkins Lymphoma and 
alleged that this was due to their exposure to PCB.7 
 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
 
Appellants are three California residents who developed 
lymphohematopietic cancer, also known as Non-Hodgkin’s Lymphoma, 
allegedly due to their exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) released 
into the environment by Respondent.8  PCBs are a class of chemical 
compounds used in the manufacturing of capacitors, transformers, paints, 
varnishes, adhesives, hydraulic fluids, and carbonless copy paper.9  PCBs 
were designed to be resistant to heat and chemical breakdown, and no known 
natural sources of PCBs exist in the environment.10  This resilience has 
resulted in their continued presence in the environment to this day even 
though their manufacture and sale were banned in the United States over 
thirty years ago.11  
 
Appellants brought action against the successor of the PCB’s 
manufacturer, Pharmacia,12 alleging negligence and strict liability.13  In their 
negligence claim at the trial court level, Appellants alleged that Pharmacia 
was negligent in distributing and marketing various PCB products it was 
                                                
5 Id. 
6 Polychlorinated Biphenyls (PCBs), ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH 
ENVIRONMENTAL FACT SHEET (Feb. 2009), 
http://www.idph.state.il.us/envhealth/factsheets/polychlorinatedbiphenyls.htm. 
7 Clair v. Monsanto, 412 S.W.3d 295 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
8 Id.at 300. 
9 Id. at 301. 
10 Id. 
11 Id.  
12 Pharmecia did business under the name of Monsanto at all times relevant to this 
case. In 2000, Old Monsanto merged with a subsidiary of Pharmacia and changed its 
name to Pharmacia. The entity now known as Monsanto was formed in 2000 and is 
defending Old Monsanto under an indemnification agreement. All further references 
to Monsanto are to Old Monsanto. Id. at 300 nn.1-2. 
13 Id. at 295. 
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“aware or should have been aware of the hazards of PCBs and either knew or 
should have known the PCBs would be released into the environment.”14  At 
trial, Appellants used expert testimony to assert that Pharmacia knew as early 
as 1938 that PCBs were toxic if given enough exposure, and that Pharmacia 
had actual knowledge that many of its PCBs would be released into the 
environment by third parties.15  In their strict liability claim, Appellants claim 
the PCBs were “defectively designed” because the PCBs made their way into 
the environment and the food chain as a result of the dumping of PCB-
containing products and the incorporation of PCBs into “open-use” products 
like paints, varnishes, and adhesives.16 Appellants contend that Pharmacia’s 
negligence and defective design resulted in their exposure to PCBs, which 
was a substantial factor in their development of cancer.17  
 
Pharmacia then filed a motion for summary judgment arguing against 
both the negligence and strict liability claims.18  With respect to the 
negligence claim, Pharmacia argued that it had “no duty to protect 
[Appellants] from the conduct of downstream users of PCBs or from injuries 
related to the presence of PCBs in the environment.”19  With respect to the 
strict liability claim, Pharmacia asserted three different arguments.20  First, 
Pharmacia argued that the Appellants “cannot prove they were harmed as a 
result of an intended or foreseeable use of the product.”21  Second, Pharmacia 
argued that Appellants “have no evidence as to what PCBs they were 
exposed to, and therefore, the risk versus benefit analysis to determine 
whether the product was defective cannot be applied.”22  Third, Pharmacia 
asserted that “if the court determines there is no duty in negligence, then 
there is no duty in strict liability.”23  
 
                                                
14 Id.at 302. 
15 Id. at 301. 
16 Id. at 301-02. 
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The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Pharmacia.24  
Because the Appellants could not specify what path the PCBs took from the 
manufacturer to their bloodstream nor when the PCBs in their blood was 
manufactured, the trial court reasoned that Pharmacia should not owe a duty 
to Appellants because it would mean Pharmacia was “an insurer of its 
products for all places, times, and conditions.”25  In addition, the trial court 
noted that the connection between Appellant’s injuries and Pharmacia’s 
conduct was “not sufficiently close to weigh strongly in favor of imposing a 
legal duty on Pharmacia, and Pharmacia could not reasonably foresee its 
conduct would harm Plaintiffs.”26  
 
The trial court further found public policy supported a holding 
exempting Pharmacia from a duty for this particular category of conduct.27  
Imposing this duty would be excessive, opined the trial court, because 
Pharmacia would be forced to defend against a potentially “limitless pool of 
plaintiffs.”28  Further, the trial court noted that there was nothing they could 
do to prevent or mitigate future injuries because of the existing prevalence of 
PCBs in the environment.29  As a matter of law, the trial court found that 
Pharmacia owed no duty to Appellants and granted their motion for summary 
judgment on the claim of negligence.30 
 
In its judgment for the claim based on strict liability, the trial court 
found, as a matter of law, that Pharmacia cannot be held strictly liable to 
Appellants “for injuries caused by PCBs in the environment resulting from 
the unforeseeable and unintended uses of dumping, disposal, scrapping, 
recycling, incineration, and destruction of PCBs and PCB-containing 
products by third parties.”31  The trial court found that Appellants “had not 
and would not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier of fact 






29 Id. at 303. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.  
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to find intended and foreseeable uses of PCBs were a substantial factor in 
causing their injuries.”32  For these reasons, the trial court granted the 
summary judgment in favor of Pharmacia on both the negligence and strict 
liability claims.33 
 
The instant court reversed and remanded.34  The Court of Appeals 
found that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on the 
negligence claim because Appellants had established that Pharmacia owed a 
duty of reasonable care.35  The Court of Appeals balanced a number of 
considerations, known as the “Rowland factors,”36 in determining whether 
public policy clearly supported an exception from the general principle that 
“everyone in California has a duty to exercise reasonable care.”37  The two 
primary Rowland factors the Court of Appeals considered on the question of 
legal duty were foreseeability and questions of public policy, namely, the 
extent of the burden on the defendant.38  Ultimately, the Court of Appeals 
found that it was generally foreseeable that the design, manufacture, and 
distribution of PCBs could result in the type of injuries experienced, and the 
considerations of the Rowland public policy factors resulted in a finding that 
Pharmacia owed a duty of care as a matter of public policy.39 
 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
A.  Negligence Cause of Action 
 
The court cites to Section 1714 of the California Civil Code in 
determining whether Pharmacia owed a duty to the Appellants.40  
Specifically, the court quotes the pertinent portion of the statute:  
                                                
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id.at 300.  
35 Id. at 304. 
36 Id. at 305, citing Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 
564 (1968). 
37 Id. at 304. 
38 Id. at 305. 
39 Id. at 306, 309. 
40 Id. at 304.  




Everyone is responsible, not only for the result of his or her 
willful acts, but also for an injury occasioned to another by 
his or her want of ordinary care or skill in the management of 
his or her property or person, except so far as the latter has, 
willfully or by want of ordinary care, brought the injury upon 
himself or herself.41 
 
This portion of the statute means that everyone in California has a 
general duty to exercise reasonable care.42  However, exceptions to this 
general principle have been carved out when they are clearly supported by 
the balancing of a number of considerations, called “the Rowland factors.”43  
These include: the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury; the 
closeness of the connection between the defendant’s conduct and the injury 
suffered; the foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff; the moral blame attached 
to the defendant’s conduct; the extent of the burden to the defendant; the 
policy of preventing future harm; the consequences to the community of 
imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability for breach; and, the 
availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.44 
 
In Rowland v. Christian, a Supreme Court of California case from 
1968, the plaintiff, Mr. Rowland, was a guest in the defendant, Ms. 
Christian’s, home.45  The defendant had a cracked faucet handle that injured 
the plaintiff’s hand upon use.46  The plaintiff alleged that the defendant was 
aware of the dangerous condition, and that the plaintiff’s injuries were 
proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.47  The defendant admitted 
she told the landlord that the faucet was defective and it should be replaced, 
but defendant also alleged contributory negligence and assumption of risk, 
alleging that plaintiff knew of the condition of the premises and he had 
                                                
41 Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 2012). 
42 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304.  
43 Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal.2d 108, 70 Cal.Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561, 564 (1968). 
44 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304-05. 
45 Rowland, 69 Cal.2d at 110. 
46 Id. 
47 Id. 
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merely failed to see the crack.48  The court laid out the general California law 
on negligence as it existed then, “All persons are required to use ordinary 
care to prevent others being injured as a result of their conduct.”49  Further, 
the court noted that no exceptions to this general rule should be made unless 
clearly supported by public policy.50  It is here where the Court enunciates 
what are known as the Rowland factors.51 
 
 The Court in Rowland gathers case law from California’s history, and 
in one fell swoop, lays out clearly the considerations a court must make when 
determining if an exception to the general principle of negligence is 
supported by public policy.52  These considerations, listed above, have been 
cited over 6,000 times since their conception,53 including the citation in Clair 
v. Monsanto.  But only two factors, foreseeability and the extent of the 
                                                
48 Id. at 111. 
49 Id. at 112. 
50 Id. (Citing Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 224, 229-30 
(1961)). Lipman states that government officials are not personally liable for their 
discretionary acts within the scope of their authority even though it is alleged that their 
conduct was malicious. This is due to important policy considerations such as the 
subjection of officials to the burden of a trial and to the danger that it would impair 
their zeal in the performance of their functions.  
51 Rowland, 69 Cal.2d at 113. 
52 Rowland, at 112-13. The Court cites: Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited, 67 A.C. 
228, 233, fn. 3, 60 Cal. Rptr. 510, 430 P.2d 68;Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal.2d 440, 
443—445, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4, 393 P.2d 164; Merrill v. Buck, 58 Cal.2d 552, 561—562, 25 
Cal. Rptr. 456, 375 P.2d 304; Chance v. Lawry's, Inc., 58 Cal.2d 368, 377, 24 Cal. 
Rptr. 209, 374 P.2d 185;  Lipman v. Brisbane Elementary Sch. Dist., 55 Cal.2d 
224,229-230 (1961).; Stewart v. Cox, 55 Cal.2d 857, 863, 13 Cal. Rptr. 521, 362 P.2d 
345; Biakanja v. Irving, 49 Cal.2d 647, 650, 320 P.2d 16, 65 A.L.R.2d 1358; Wright v. 
Arcade School Dist., 230 Cal.App.2d 272, 278, 40 Cal. Rptr. 812; Raymond v. 
Paradise Unified School Dist., 218 Cal.App.2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847; Prosser on Torts 
(3d ed. 1964) pp. 148—151; 2 Harper and James, The Law of Torts (1956) pp. 1052, 
1435 et seq. 
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burden to the defendant, have evolved to become the primary factors to be 
considered on the question of legal duty supporting negligence liability.54 
  
In 2004, Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. became the first 
case to note the evolution of the Rowland factors into two primary 
considerations.55  In Vasquez, the court clearly states that the Rowland factors 
that are to be weighed in the balancing analysis will vary with each case,56 
but the factors of foreseeability and the extent of burden to the defendant 
“have evolved to become the primary factors considered in every case.”57  
The most recent case that upholds this list of primary factors, and is cited by 
the court in Clair, is the 2012 case Campbell v. Ford Motor Co.58  
 
The courts in Campbell and Clair both cite to Cabral v. Ralphs 
Grocery Co.,59 a 2011 case, explaining an important feature of the Rowland 
analysis: the factors are to be evaluated at a relatively broad level of 
factuality.60  Thus, as to foreseeability, as the court in Cabral put it, the 
court’s task in determining duty “is not to decide whether a particular 
plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular 
defendant’s conduct, but rather to evaluate more generally whether the 
category of negligent conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the 
kind of harm experienced that liability may appropriately be imposed…”61  
Further, the court noted a distinct difference between a determination that the 
defendant did not breach the duty of ordinary care, which is for the jury to 
decide in a trial, and a determination that the defendant owed the plaintiff no 
duty of ordinary care to begin with, which is for the court to decide.62  If the 
court finds the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of ordinary care, the jury 
may consider the likelihood or foreseeability of injury in determining 
                                                
54 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305. 
55 118 Cal.App.4th 269 (2004). 
56 Id. at 280. 
57 Id. at 280, n. 5. 
58 206 Cal.App.4th 15, 33 (2012). 
59 51 Cal.4th 764. 
60 Id. at 772. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
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whether the particular defendant’s conduct was negligent in the first place.63  
A court would first have to identify the conduct of a defendant as categorical 
“no duty” conduct in order to absolve the defendant of a duty of ordinary 
care.64  However, once a court identifies that a category of conduct may 
require a duty of ordinary care, the debate does not end there. The court still 
must turn to the question of foreseeability and examine whether the other 
Rowland factors justify creating a duty exception.65 
 
B.  Strict Products Liability Cause of Action 
 
The elements of a strict products liability cause of action are: (1) a 
defect in the manufacture or design of the product or a failure to warn, (2) 
causation, and (3) injury.66 According to the California Supreme Court, a 
product can be found defective under one of two tests: the consumer 
expectations test or the risk-benefit test.67  Under the consumer expectations 
test, the plaintiff must prove that the product failed to perform as safely as an 
ordinary consumer would expect when used in a reasonably foreseeable 
manner in order for the product to be defective in design.68  Under the risk-
benefit test, two things must happen in order to prove a product is defective 
in design: (1) the plaintiff must prove that the product’s design proximately 
caused injury, and (2) the defendant must have failed to prove that the 
benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such 
design.69  The risk-benefit test is to be used when the ordinary consumer 
would have difficulty knowing what to expect concerning the safety design 
of a product.70  If the product embodies “excessive preventable danger,” or if 
the jury finds that the risk of inherent danger in the challenged design 
outweighs the benefits of such design, the product is defective in design.71 
 
                                                
63 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305 (citing Cabral). 
64 Id. at 305-06. 
65 Id. at 308. 
66 Nelson v. Superior Court, 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 695 (2006). 
67 Barker v. Lull Engineering Co. Inc., 20 Cal.3d 413, 430-32 (1978). 
68 Id. 
69 Id. See also, Moreno v. Fey Manufacturing Corp., 149 Cal.App.3d 23, 26-27 (1983). 
70 Bates v. John Deer Co., 148 Cal.App.3d 40, 52 (1983). 
71 Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 430.  
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 The jury may consider several factors in evaluating the adequacy of a 
product’s design.72  These factors include “the gravity of the danger posed by 
the design, the likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical 
feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of an improved 
design, and the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that 
would result from an alternative design.”73  
 
To establish a prima facie case under strict products liability, the 
plaintiff must show that his or her injury was proximately caused by the 
product’s design.74  To make this showing, the plaintiff must produce 
evidence showing that he or she was injured while using or coming into 
contact with the product in an intended or reasonably foreseeable manner.75  
The plaintiff must also show that the absence of a safety device or the nature 
of the product’s design frustrated his or her ability to avoid injury.76  
 
Once the plaintiff makes a prima facie case by showing that his or her 
injury was proximately caused by the product’s design, the burden shifts to 
the defendant to prove that the product was not defective.77  The defendant 
bears the ultimate burden of proof to establish that its product was not 
defective because the plaintiff’s injury resulted from misuse of the product; 
this burden should be distinguished from the burden on the plaintiff making a 
prima facie case.78  If the defendant shows that the plaintiff misused the 
product in such a highly extraordinary, unforeseeable way, the defendant has 
an affirmative defense absolving it of its wrongful conduct.79  Because a 
manufacturer is required to reasonably foresee misuse of a product by a user 
                                                
72 Id. at 431. 
73 Id. 
74 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305. (citing Perez v. VAS S.p.A., 188 Cal.App.4th 658, 676 
(2010)). 




79 Chavez v. Glock, Inc., 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1308 (2012). 
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or a third party, the class of foreseeable uses is quite broad.80  Foreseeability 
of this nature is a question for the jury.81  
 
California case law establishes that plaintiffs involved in injury suits 
for the development of cancer due to exposure to toxic chemicals must also 
show, in addition to the aforementioned burdens, some threshold exposure to 
the toxic chemical, and must prove that exposure was a “substantial factor 
causing the illness by showing by a reasonable medical probability that the 
plaintiff’s exposure contributed to the plaintiff’s risk of developing cancer.”82 
 
IV. INSTANT DECISION 
 
A.  Negligence Claim 
 
In the instant case, the Missouri Court of Appeals in the Eastern 
District reviewed the granting of summary judgment de novo and applied 
California law to evaluate the merits of the Appellants’ substantive claims.83  
The appellate court began its analysis with the argument that the trial court 
erred in granting summary judgment on the Appellants’ negligence claim 
brought under California law because Appellants had established Pharmacia 
owed them a duty of reasonable care.84  Analyzing the California Civil Code 
on Obligations Imposed by Law,85 the appellate court established that 
“generally everyone in California has a duty to exercise reasonable care.”86  
                                                
80 Nelson v. Superior Court, 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 698 (2006). 
81 Chavez, 207 Cal.App.4th at 1308 (internal citations omitted).  
82 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 312. 
83 Id. at 304. (citing Moore ex rel. Moore v. Bi-State Development Agency, 87 S.W.3d 
279, 285 (Mo.App. E.D. 2002). The Court of Appeals applied Missouri law for the 
standard of review, as it noted that a forum state will always apply forum procedure. 
Further, the court stated with regard to substantive law, a forum state will choose the 
applicable law according to its own conflict of law doctrines. Id. For tort claims, 
Missouri applies the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws 
Section 145 (1971). Id. Because the injuries occurred in California, the Appellants 
came into contact with PCBs in California, the Appellants all reside in California, and 
the parties all agree that California law applies to the substantive claims in this case, 
the court applied Section 145 of the Restatement and found California law should be 
used to evaluate the substantive claims. 
84 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304.  
85 Cal. Civ. Code § 1714 (West 2012). 
86 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304. 
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However, the appellate court noted that exceptions from this general 
principle are made when public policy clearly supports the exception.87  
Courts must balance a number of considerations known as the “Rowland 
factors”88  to determine if public policy supports the exception from the 
general rule.89 The considerations that have evolved into the two primary 
Rowland factors to be considered on the question of legal duty are 
foreseeability and the extent of burden to the defendant; the factors are 
evaluated at a relatively broad level of factual generality.90 
 
The appellate court continued its analysis by next examining the 
foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff.91  The court explained that its task in 
determining a duty owed is to evaluate whether the “category of negligent 
conduct at issue is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm 
experienced.”92  Two different types of determinations must be distinguished 
by the court when discussing foreseeability: a determination that the 
defendant owed the plaintiff no duty of ordinary care, and a determination 
that the defendant did not breach the duty of ordinary care.93  The former 
determination is for the court to make, while the latter determination is for 
the jury to make.94  
 
Using this rule, the court reviewed the trial court’s holding that 
Pharmacia did not breach the duty of ordinary care to Appellants, and found 
that because the trial court made determinations on the category of conduct 
that Pharmacia undertook, it incorrectly made fact-finding determinations95 
                                                
87 Id. 
88 Rowland,  443 P.2d at 564. 
89 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 304. 
90 Id. at 305 (citing Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 141 Cal. Rptr. 3rd 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2012); Cabral v. Ralphs Grocery Co., 248 P.3d 1170, 1175 (Cal. 2011)). 
91 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 305. 
92 Id.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 The factual determinations made include: that the Appellants could not specify when 
the PCBs in their blood were manufactured or what path they took from the 
manufacturer to each  Appellant, and that it was possible the  
Appellants ingested PCBs illegally dumped by third parties decades after they were 
manufactured. Id. at 306. 
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on the breach of ordinary care, instead of the duty owed.96  The appellate 
court further noted that the trial court made an incorrect determination of the 
category of conduct at issue; Pharmacia’s category of conduct at issue was 
not protecting Appellants from the conduct of downstream users of PCBs, as 
the trial court said, but the design, manufacturing, and distribution of PCBs.97  
The appellate court made this finding because the actual conduct at issue 
involved the design, distribution, and manufacturing of PCBs, a unique class 
of chemicals resistant to environmental breakdown, and the duty to protect 
Appellants from the conduct of downstream users of PCBs is too expansive.98 
 
After determining the category of negligent conduct, the appellate 
court then continued its analysis of foreseeability by determining whether the 
design, distribution, and manufacture of PCBs was sufficiently likely to result 
in the kind of harm experienced by the Appellants.99  Because the Rowland 
factors are evaluated at a broad level of general factuality, the appellate court 
found that Appellants provided sufficient evidence showing that Pharmacia 
had a duty to exercise reasonable care in the design, distribution, and 
manufacture of PCBs because it was “generally foreseeable” that this conduct 
may increase the risk of developing non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.100  Because 
PCBs are very stable and resistant to environmental breakdown, because 
Appellants provided evidence that the presence of PCBs in the environment 
resulted in an increased risk of cancer for those exposed to PCBs, and 
because, given the nature of PCBs, the lapse between their creation and 
Appellants’ injuries is irrelevant, specific factual questions regarding 
foreseeability and proximate cause should be handled by the jury, not by a 
court making determinations of duty as a matter of law, as the trial court 
did.101  
 
After determining foreseeability, the appellate court examined the 
Rowland public policy factors to determine whether a duty exception still 
                                                
96 Id. 




101 Id. at 308. 
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existed in the instant case.102  The specific question the court examined is 
whether the policy of preventing future harm by imposing costs upon 
Pharmacia is outweighed by undesirable consequences of allowing potential 
liability or laws indicating approval of designing, distributing, and 
manufacturing PCBs.103  The appellate court found no such laws indicating 
approval of this conduct.104  Further, the appellate court dispelled the notion 
that Pharmacia should escape liability because of the flood of litigation in St. 
Louis courts and of the potentially limitless pool of possible plaintiffs, as 
they were very successful in designing, distributing, and manufacturing 
PCBs.105  The court opined that it would not be sound policy to allow the 
mere ubiquitous nature of PCBs to preclude liability because such a finding 
might allow manufacturers to avoid taking precautions to produce a safe 
product as long as it made enough of the product.106  The court stated that the 
imposition of a duty in this instance, while it would do little to prevent future 
harm from PCBs, serves as a warning to manufacturers creating dangerous 
products.107 
 
Because Appellants sufficiently alleged the possibility of causation by 
providing evidence showing Pharmacia had a duty to exercise reasonable 
care in the design, manufacture, and distribution of PCBs,  it was generally 
foreseeable that such a category of conduct could result in the harm 
experienced by Appellants.108  Evidence was also presented that PCBs in the 
environment resulted in an increased risk of cancer for those exposed to 
PCBs, and because the ubiquitous nature of PCBs does not preclude liability, 
the appellate court found that the public policy factors in Rowland did not 
persuade it that Pharmacia does not owe a duty of care.109  The appellate 
court held that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment with 
                                                
102 Id.  
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 308-09. 
106 Id. at 309. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 308-09. 
109 Id.  
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respect to Appellant’s cause of action for negligence because Appellants 
established that Pharmacia owed a duty of reasonable care.110 
 
B.  Strict Liability Claim 
 
In deciding the claim of strict liability by design defect, the appellate 
court first questioned whether the post-use disposal of PCBs was foreseeable 
by looking at evidence demonstrating that Pharmacia knew, or should have 
known, that many of its PCBs would enter the environment through disposal 
by third parties.111  The appellate court stated that the elements of a strict 
products liability cause of action are “a defect in the manufacture or design of 
the product or a failure to warn, causation, and injury.”112  Specifically, 
Appellants must show that “the product is placed on the market; there is 
knowledge that it will be used without inspection for defect; the product 
proves to be defective; and the defect causes injury.”113  
 
As for deciding whether the products containing PCBs were defective 
in design, the court used the “risk-benefit test because a normal consumer 
would not know what to expect concerning a safe design of a PCB.”114  
Under this test, a product is defective in design if Appellants prove that the 
product’s design “proximately caused injury” and Pharmacia fails to prove, 
in light of the relevant factors, that on balance, “the benefits of the challenged 
design outweigh the risk of danger inherent in such design.”115  To find a 
product defective in design requires a jury determination that the design 
embodies “excessive preventable danger” and that the risk of danger 
outweighs the benefits of such a design.116  Factors used in balancing the 
risks and benefits include:  
 
                                                
110 Id. 
111 Id.  
112 Id. (citing Nelson v. Superior Court, 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 695, 50 Cal.Rptr.3d 684 
(2006)). 
113 Id. (citing Nelson, 144 Cal.App.4th at 689). 
114 Id. (citing Perez v. VAS S.p.A., 188 Cal.App.4th at 676, n.4 (2010)). 
115 Id. (citing Perez, 118 Cal.App.4th at 676). 
116 Id. (citing Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 430). 
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the gravity of danger posed by the challenged design, the 
likelihood that such danger would occur, the mechanical 
feasibility of a safer alternative design, the financial cost of 
an improved design, and the adverse consequences to the 
product and to the consumer that would result from an 
alternative design.117 
 
Once Appellants have made a prima facie showing that their injuries 
were proximately caused by Pharmacia’s product design, the burden shifts to 
Pharmacia to prove that its product is not defective in light of the preceding 
factors.118  To make a prima facie case, Appellants must show evidence that 
they were injured while using or coming into contact with the product in “an 
intended or reasonably foreseeable manner” and that no safety device or safe 
nature of the product allowed Appellants to avoid injury.119  The appellate 
court held that the trial court erred in determining that Pharmacia could not 
be held strictly liable because the trial court made a fact-finder’s 
determination that post-use disposal of PCBs was unforeseeable after 
Appellants had made the requisite prima facie case.120 
 
Next, the appellate court decided whether a genuine issue of material 
fact existed. Appellants introduced expert testimony regarding Pharmacia’s 
internal documents showing that it knew or should have known its PCBs 
would be improperly disposed of by third parties.121 Appellants also 
introduced laboratory analysis showing that they had elevated levels of PCBs 
in their bloodstream.122  Further expert testimony described how the risk of 
non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma increased the more prevalent PCBs are in the 
blood, and because Appellants’ blood levels show that PCBs were a 
substantial factor in their development of lymphoma, the appellate court held 
that Appellants did in fact show that there is a genuine issue of material fact 
                                                
117 Id. at 309-310 (citing Barker, 20 Cal.3d at 431).  
118 Id. at 310.  
119 Id. (citing Perez, 188 Cal.App.4th at 678). 
120 Id. at 311.  
121 Id.  
122 Id. 
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of whether their injuries were caused by a foreseeable misuse of PCB-
containing products.123  
 
Next, the appellate court opined on the trial court’s second finding for 
Pharmacia that Appellants could not prove whether the PCBs in their blood 
were from other PCB sources or “open-use” products containing PCBs.124  
The appellate court, in determining whether the sources of the PCBs 
mattered, relied on a California case125 rule that Appellants must “show some 
threshold exposure to PCBs and must prove that exposure was a substantial 
factor causing the illness.”126  Appellants can show this by introducing a 
“reasonable medical probability” that their exposure to PCBs contributed to 
their risk of developing cancer.127  Appellants brought in evidence showing 
that their blood contained elevated levels of PCB.128  They further brought in 
various experts to testify to internal documents that show Pharmacia should 
have known that its open-use PCBs would result in substantial releases of 
those PCBs into the environment.129 Further evidence by Appellants 
indicated that Pharmacia knew open-use PCB products were the “major 
source” of PCBs entering the environment.130 
 
The appellate court looked to Appellants’ evidence to decide whether 
a genuine issue of material fact existed regarding whether their injuries were 
caused by foreseeable and intended uses of open-use PCB-containing 
products.131  Using the preceding evidence, the appellate court found that at 
least a genuine issue of material fact existed with respect to whether 
Appellants’ injuries were caused by foreseeable and intended uses of open-
use PCB-containing products, and the trial court erred in granting summary 
                                                
123 Id. at 312. 
124 Id. 
125 Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953, 982, 67 Cal.Rptr.2d 16, 941 
P.2d 1203 (1997).  
126 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 312 (citing Rutherford, 16 Cal.4th at 982). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
130 Id. at 313. 
131 Id. 
LINGERING HAZARDOUS CHEMICALS 
 
396
judgment for Pharmacia regarding Appellants’ cause of action for design 
defect.132  
 
On August 22, 2013, the “Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to 
the Supreme Court” was denied, and on November 26, 2013, the 
“Application for Transfer to the Supreme Court” was denied.133 
 
V.  COMMENT 
 
This decision has enormous implications, and is the first of several 
hundred cases moving forward from plaintiffs with non-Hodgkin’s 
lymphoma and an elevated level of PCBs in their bloodstream.134  According 
to the press release submitted after the court of appeals decision, “[t]he case 
represents the first time that injured victims have sought to hold a company 
accountable for producing a chemical that has contaminated the entire planet, 
including every person in the United States.”135  Though imposing a duty 
could do little to prevent future harm from PCBs, this decision effectively 
serves as a warning for manufacturers to be cautious in their design, 
marketing, and production of potentially harmful products.136  The denial of 
transfer and/or rehearing from the Missouri Supreme Court has hermetically 
sealed the court of appeals decision from augmentation.  
 
Large companies worldwide produce chemicals that are potentially 
hazardous to human health, and they can no longer hide from liability under 
the veils of ubiquity or product misuse. Should other courts adopt the rules 
set by the court of appeals in Missouri, a country-wide standard may be set, 
and it may even prompt federal action to determine new standards for 
                                                
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
134 Ross Bonander, Lymphoma Patients Suing Monsanto Get Favorable Appeals 




136 Mistake as to the chemical or product furnished or misdescription thereof by label 
or otherwise as basis of liability for personal injury or death resulting from 
combination with other chemical, 123 A.L.R. 939 (1939). 
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products potentially harmful to human health.  Though the court of appeals 
did not discuss the application of this decision to other industries or products, 
this case may be a springboard for other types of products liability claims, not 
just chemically hazardous products.  
 
It is a shame that the Supreme Court of Missouri denied the motion to 
transfer the court of appeals decision.  The Supreme Court may well have 
further defined or constricted the standards to be met by producers of 
potentially dangerous material.  The Supreme Court could have deteriorated 
the court of appeals decision, but in any case, the denial of transfer means 
that the case is to be remanded to determine the issues of fact still present 
using the rules the court of appeals has dictated.137  
 
While public policy factors were used to determine whether an 
exception from the general duty of ordinary care existed, the court of appeals 
did not discuss the public policy factors of deciding a case of this magnitude.  
While it is just to decide a case in a vacuum without external influences, the 
court of appeals should have addressed or possibly lessened the likelihood 
that courts could be flooded with plaintiffs from around the country citing 
this case to recover from injuries occurring from products that were not 
intended to be used by such a person. Companies now must be aware that 
bystanders could bring a suit even if the consumer of a hazardous product 
misused the product in a foreseeable way to cause harm to the bystander. 
Product misuse, an affirmative defense, can now only be effective when the 
misuse by the consumer is “so highly extraordinary as to be 
unforeseeable.”138  Essentially, manufacturers of a dangerous product may 
have little recourse if the plaintiff shows that his or her injuries stemmed 
from a foreseeable misuse of the dangerous product. A court merely needs to 
generally evaluate whether the category of negligent conduct at issue is 
sufficiently likely to result in the kind of harm experienced.  
 
Companies who have previously manufactured and sold hazardous 
products must now be aware that they could be strictly liable for injuries 
resulting from those products, even if they are banned or no longer on the 
                                                
137 Clair, 412 S.W.3d at 300. 
138 Id. at 310 (citing Chavez v. Glock, Inc., 207 Cal.App.4th at 1308). 
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market.  Insurance policies may be purchased by companies creating 
dangerous products to protect them from the possibility of huge legal claims. 
As long as it was generally foreseeable by the producer that the design, 
manufacture, and distribution of a hazardous product could result in a 
plaintiff’s injuries, a company today may have to answer for its negligence in 
the past.  This could have significant ramifications for companies that 
produce hazardous chemicals. An important aspect of this decision is that it 
does not address the hazardous byproducts that result from the creation or 
distribution of an otherwise safe product. Air pollution from refineries and 
chemical plants is not subject to a products liability claim, so no redress may 
be available for plaintiffs injured as a foreseeable consequence to the 
pollution.  The Clean Air Act may be an avenue for these types of plaintiffs, 
and this case is perhaps the first step to a federal program to hold companies 
liable for products that may be currently banned but continue to harm people. 
 
The fact that this decision creates the possibility of legal liability for 
actions a company took many years ago is troublesome, however.  A 
perfectly compliant company with a decades old creed of environmental 
safety and responsibility could nonetheless be sued for reckless behavior 
during the development of the company in the last century. The court of 
appeals in Clair does not create a standard of strict liability, and many 
findings of fact regarding the different Rowland factors must still be made to 
hold a company liable.  But a company may, nonetheless, be unable to escape 
from the mistakes its predecessors made.  The legal costs from paying a 
seemingly endless list of plaintiffs along with the ensuing public 
embarrassment and condemnation from consumers may well cost a company 
its life upon the conclusion of a trial. Though this cost is not a primary 
Rowland factor to be examined by a court, companies should continue to 
lobby courts to give this factor more weight. Further, another factor that 
could have been introduced by the court of appeals in Clair to add to the 
Rowland factors is the company’s current and historical devotion to 
environmental and consumer safety and protection.  If this factor was 
introduced, companies that have been doing the right thing for many years 
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VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
This case represents the first time that a company may be held liable 
for producing a chemical that has potentially contaminated every person in 
the United States.  The Court of Appeals has created a new task for courts to 
determine liability.  No longer should a court decide whether a particular 
plaintiff’s injury was reasonably foreseeable in light of a particular 
defendant’s conduct. Now, a court must evaluate more generally whether the 
category of negligent conduct is sufficiently likely to result in the kind of 
harm experienced by the plaintiff. Once the foreseeability of harm due to the 
negligent conduct is established, it is then the court’s task to determine 
whether that conduct is appropriate for a general no-duty ruling.  To 
determine this, the court must use several public policy factors, including: the 
gravity and likelihood of danger resulting from eliminating the duty, the 
financial cost of improving the design, and the adverse consequences to the 
product and to the consumer that would result from imposing a duty. This 
case is among the first to claim that mere ubiquity in the market is not 
sufficient to shield a company from liability due to the harmful effects of its 
products.  
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